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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No.  13-4299 
________________ 
 
IN RE: GARY L. REINERT, SR. et al., 
                                  Debtors 
 
 
METAL FOUNDATIONS ACQUISITION, LLC. 
 
v. 
 
GARY L. REINERT, SR., 
                                         Appellant 
 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-12-cv-01782)  
District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 16, 2015 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 20, 2015) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
Defendant, Gary L. Reinert, Sr., appeals the District Court’s affirmance of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order requiring Reinert to return certain converted assets to Plaintiff, 
Metal Foundations Acquisition, LLC (“MFA”). We will affirm.  
I.  
 A bankruptcy sale proceeding and a later conversion action are relevant to this 
appeal. In the bankruptcy sale proceeding, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania approved the sale of the assets of various Reinert-
controlled entities to MFA. Following the bankruptcy sale proceeding, MFA filed a 
Complaint in Equity against Reinert in Pennsylvania state court alleging Reinert 
converted personal property, proprietary trade secrets, and confidential information that 
MFA purchased during the bankruptcy sale proceeding. With consent of the parties, 
MFA’s complaint was removed to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, where MFA subsequently filed a Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction. It is MFA’s conversion action against Reinert that we review on appeal.  
The bankruptcy sale proceeding took place as follows. Fifth Third Bank, as the 
primary secured creditor, obtained a receivership order against Reinert and certain 
Reinert-controlled entities in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania. Reinert and certain Reinert-controlled entities later commenced voluntary 
Chapter 11 cases before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania. Those entities included Power Contracting, Inc.; MFPF, Inc.; Metal 
Foundations, LLC; Dressel Associates, Inc.; and Flying Roadrunner, Inc. (hereinafter 
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“debtor entities”). Certain Reinert-controlled entities, namely SAFE Foundations, LLC 
(“SAFE Foundations”), and SAFE Extensions, Inc. (“SAFE Extensions”), were subject to 
the receivership order but not included in the bankruptcy filings (“non-debtor entities”). 
The bankruptcy cases were jointly administered, a Chapter 11 trustee was appointed, and 
the Trustee sold certain assets to MFA.  
During the asset sale, Fifth Third Bank sold its secured claims to MFA. The 
Trustee then held an auction to sell assets subject to the lien of Fifth Third Bank, which 
now belonged to MFA. Ownership of the lien provided MFA with the right to credit bid 
its acquired secured claim at auction. No bankruptcy schedules were filed at the time of 
the auction. Although the Bankruptcy Court in the bankruptcy sale proceeding cautioned 
against proceeding to sale without schedules setting forth the identity of various debtors’ 
assets, the parties chose to proceed to auction. At auction, no competing bidder emerged 
and MFA subsequently purchased certain assets defined by a “credit bid letter 
agreement” (“CBA”). The CBA provided that all of the assets of all of the debtor entities 
were to be sold to MFA. In addition, the CBA provided that certain unencumbered assets 
of the debtors, including assets of Mr. Reinert, were also to be sold to MFA. Although 
MFA had a lien against SAFE Extensions and SAFE Foundations, they were not included 
in the CBA because they were non-debtors who were believed to own no assets. The 
assets included in the CBA were described in exhibits as “all of those [assets] used or 
related to the operation of foundations business” by the debtor entities. The Bankruptcy 
Court in the bankruptcy sale proceeding subsequently approved the sale. Believing it had 
acquired all of the assets of Reinert-controlled entities used in or related to the operation 
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of foundations business, MFA then released its lien, including the lien it held against 
SAFE Foundations.  
The CBA was prepared based upon the due diligence of MFA, with the assistance 
of the Trustee, Reinert, and his agents. Specifically, the CBA relied upon representations 
made by Reinert. First, Reinert represented that SAFE Extensions had dissolved years 
before the bankruptcy petition date. Second, Reinert represented to PNC Bank, Fifth 
Third Bank, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that Metal Foundations, LLC, 
which was a debtor under the control of the Trustee and a party to the CBA, was the 
successor of SAFE Foundations. This representation was made again directly to MFA. 
Finally, exhibits to the CBA were circulated to Reinert stating that the assets in question 
belonged to Metal Foundations, LLC. Reinert did not object to these exhibits or claim the 
assets were owned by any entity other than Metal Foundations, LLC. In other words, 
Reinert represented to the Bankruptcy Court in the bankruptcy sale proceeding that any 
assets that were once owned by SAFE Extensions and SAFE Foundations were now 
owned by parties subject to the CBA. 
  In the conversion action reviewed here, Reinert’s primary defense to MFA’s 
conversion claim was that the assets in question were not sold to MFA because they 
belonged to SAFE Extensions and SAFE Foundations, which were not subject to the 
CBA. Because Reinert’s position in the conversion action was in direct contrast to his 
representations in the bankruptcy sale proceeding—that SAFE Extensions and SAFE 
Foundations owned no assets—the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court in the 
conversion action found equitable estoppel to bar Reinert from denying his 
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representations in the bankruptcy sale proceeding. Accordingly, Reinert was found to 
have converted, and thus ordered to return, MFA’s assets.  
II.1  
 Reinert argues that the use of “equitable estoppel” in the conversion action defined 
the scope of the sale in the bankruptcy sale proceeding beyond the Bankruptcy Court’s 
jurisdiction.  But we see no jurisdictional issue in this case. Instead, the issue here is the 
finality of the bankruptcy sale proceeding.  
 We have recognized the importance of providing finality to bankruptcy court 
orders such that they can be relied upon by third parties. Cf., e.g., Pittsburgh Food & 
Beverage, Inc. v. Ranallo, 112 F.3d 645, 649-50 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that jurisdictional 
challenges to the authority of the Trustee under section 363(b) are moot if the stay 
required by section 363(m) is not obtained and a reversal or modification would affect the 
validity of the sale). There were many opportunities in the bankruptcy sale proceeding for 
Reinert to object that the assets in question were not properly part of the sale, including at 
the hearing on the motion to approve the sale, at which Reinert was silent, and upon 
direct appeal after acquiring a stay. But rather than object or appeal, Reinert allowed the 
approval of the sale to become final. Reinert explained that he did not view objecting in 
the bankruptcy sale proceeding as a “big deal . . . because [he] thought MFA bought all 
the assets,” including those at issue in this appeal. Reinert was not alone in this belief, as 
                                              
1 We exercise plenary review over the Bankruptcy Court’s legal conclusions and the 
District Court’s appellate review of the Bankruptcy Court’s decision. In re Miller, 730 
F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2013). The factual findings of the Bankruptcy Court are reviewed 
for clear error. Id. The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b), 
1334(b), and 1452(a). The District Court had jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.  
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MFA also understood the sale to include the assets in question. Reinert’s representations 
that SAFE Extensions and SAFE Foundations owned no assets2 formed a core premise of 
the Bankruptcy Court’s approval of the sale in the bankruptcy sale proceeding and 
MFA’s decision to release its lien.  Nonetheless, upon accusations that he has converted 
assets of MFA, Reinert now asserts the assets were actually owned by SAFE Extensions 
and SAFE Foundations. In other words, Reinert wishes to undo the finality of the 
bankruptcy sale proceeding by taking a contrary position in the later conversion action. 
But Reinert never objected to the sale or appealed it and he cannot do so now in the later 
conversion action. Accordingly, no jurisdictional defect exists in this case. 
 Finally, Reinert contends that it was error for the court in the conversion action to 
order that he return a “tooling” asset to MFA from India. Reinert contends that the court’s 
order was based upon an erroneous factual finding that Reinert moved the tooling from 
South Africa to India after the sale to MFA. But what Reinert describes as plain error was 
harmless error. While the court said the tooling was shipped to India in 2012, which was 
after the sale, the context of the court’s opinion exposes this as a clear typographical 
error. If the court had in fact meant 2012, there would have been no need for it to explain 
that the transfer took place without the knowledge or consent of the Trustee, as by that 
time MFA would have been the owner of the tooling and the Trustee’s consent would 
have been irrelevant. In addition, all the evidence shows the tooling was moved to India 
in 2011.  
                                              
2 Reinert represented that SAFE Extensions was dissolved and SAFE Foundations was 
succeeded by Metal Foundations, LLC. During the due diligence leading up to the sale, 
Reinert represented that the only asset owned by SAFE Foundations was an excavator, 
which MFA ultimately purchased outside of the sale.  
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 But the problem for Reinert is that, even if the tooling was moved before the sale, 
it was indisputably moved after the Trustee’s appointment and without the knowledge or 
consent of the Trustee in violation of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). In its memorandum order considering Reinert’s motion 
for reconsideration, the court clarified that its order to return the tooling was based on 
Reinert’s violation of the automatic stay. Reinert is fortunate the court limited his penalty 
to returning the tooling to MFA, as a more serious penalty could have been imposed 
given the court’s finding that his “exercise of control over the tooling subsequent to the 
[T]rustee’s appointment was a sanctionable violation of the automatic stay.”3  
Accordingly, it was not error to order Reinert to return the tooling.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.  
 
                                              
3 See In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp., 901 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that the 
automatic stay provision “provides for damages upon a finding that the defendant knew 
of the automatic stay and that the defendant’s actions which violated the stay were 
intentional” (quoting In re Bloom, 875 F.2d 224, 227 (9th Cir. 1989))).  
 
